The FACTS on the extra engine for Joint Strike Fighter

FACT: The DoD says it will cost an additional $2.9B to finish the F136 engine.

In a press conference on May 20, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said, “We do believe that the full-up costs for us are about $2.9 billion. This department has a long and unhappy experience with overly optimistic contractor estimates.” Spending $2.9B in the hopes of saving $1B is not a responsible use of taxpayers’ dollars. The fact is, the extra engine team just keeps asking for (and receiving) billions of dollars despite having made very little progress. In 2008, the extra engine team said they only needed another $1B to finish development. Two years (and $1B later) the extra engine team is STILL saying they only need an additional $1B to complete development.

FACT: There was already a competition to power the F-35.

Competition for the JSF engine happened at the contractor level with all three JSF competitors selecting the P&W engine. This process of selecting subsystems, including the engine, as part of the overall weapon system, is standard during concept demonstration. Last year Senator Lieberman said: “There was a competition to build the engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. General Electric, in its proposal, lost that competition. Pratt & Whitney won that competition. Now, by way of legislation, the proponents of the second engine for this plane are trying to achieve, by legislation, what they could not achieve by competition.” GE has several military engine monopolies including the F-18, Black Hawk and Apache helicopters and the A-10 and they are not pushing an extra engine for those aircraft. GE is only in favor of competition when they lose.

FACT: The manufacturer of the extra engine is the largest supplier of military engines in the world and has several military engine monopolies.

GE is the largest military engine company in the world, producing 70% of U.S. military engines and has extensive military and commercial engine programs including sole-source contracts for more than 14,000 T700 engines for the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and more than 4,000 F404 engines for the F-18. The extra engine manufacturer isn’t advocating for extra engines for those aircraft. The customer (DoD) has stated repeatedly that it does not want the extra engine, especially if the taxpayers are footing the bill.

FACT: Terminating the extra engine will save U.S. jobs and will not harm the U.S. industrial base.

U.K. based Rolls Royce is developing and manufacturing 40 percent of the extra engine, and a large portion of the Rolls Royce content will result in U.K., not U.S. jobs. In addition, the same number of engines will be built, regardless of manufacturer. A 2007 Institute of Defense Analysis study examined the top extra engine component suppliers and concluded that it is "unlikely that any supplier would exit the domestic industrial base because of F-136 termination".

FACT: Having an extra engine will cost more money, not save money.

The DoD has repeatedly stated that the notional cost savings that would result from further engine competition for the F-35 are based on unrealistic assumptions that they cannot accept. As Secretary Gates put it, “To argue that we should add another $3 billion in what we regard as waste to protect the billion and a half (dollars) that we believe already has been wasted, frankly, I don't track the logic.” The extra engine team claims that the F-35 engine program is worth $100B and that having a competing engine will generate savings. This is incorrect on both counts. First, a GAO report released in March 2010, reports that the engine program is closer to $60B. Second, the upfront cost to design and develop the extra engine will outweigh any potential savings because taxpayers must pay the full cost to develop both engines and foot the bill for two sets of parts, two production and maintenance lines, two technology advancement programs and duplicative personnel and training.

FACT: The firm fixed price offer put forward by the F-35 extra engine team is unrealistic.

Secretary Gates said on May 20, “With respect to the proposal for the extra engine, we think the proposal is based on unrealistic cost estimates. The proposal does provide a fixed price, but not for the engine we need.”

FACT: Funding of the extra engine has and will continue to reduce the number of JSF aircraft the U.S. can afford to buy, will take many away from other, more pressing DoD needs, and will have a negative impact on the warfighter.

When Congress continues to fund the extra engine against the judgment of the President and the DoD, the funding must come from somewhere else. In the past, it has come at the expense of the overall F-35 program and has already cost the JSF program four aircraft--a negative and direct impact on national security. In Congressional testimony, senior military leaders have testified that continued funding would come at the expense of 50-80 additional aircraft, aircraft our military needs. On May 20, Secretary Gates said, “We will strongly resist efforts to impose programs and changes on the department that the military does not want, cannot afford, and that takes dollars from programs and endeavors the military services do need.”

FACT: An extra engine for the JSF increases operational complexity and risk.

Single engine sources are the norm for military aircraft. No other military aircraft developed in the past three decades has been procured with multiple engine suppliers. In testimony in February Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Norton Schwartz said, “The reality is that the F-22 and the F-18E/F are single engine airplanes. And, you know, there’s no dispute about that, and it’s because we collectively in the defense community, have become comfortable with the reliability and so on of those respective engines, one of which is a predecessor to the 135.” A case in point is the Pratt & Whitney F119 engine, powering the F-22, which is the safest, most successful fighter engine ever. The reliability of the F119 continues to set records without an extra engine. Inserting an extra engine into a program slows cost and learning curves and present operational risk and challenges to military men and women who will operate and maintain them. Proponents of the extra engine claim that a sole-source engine provider is risky. However, they are the sol-source engine provider on numerous military platforms and have never suggested those platforms need an extra engine.

FACT: The DoD is concerned about the performance of the extra engine program

On May 20, Secretary Gates said, “The proposed engine is based on the design they currently have on the test stand, which we are deeply concerned may not meet the performance needs of the Joint Strike Fighter.” The extra engine, which has yet to power an F-35 in flight, has only accumulated approximately 200 hours in 17 months of testing and has encountered significant technical difficulties. By contrast the F135 has logged more than 17,500 hours, has achieved government certification, has powered vertical flight operations, has delivered the last test engine and has transitioned to F135 production, already having delivered the first four production F135s for use by the warfighter.

FACT: The P&W engine is serving the JSF needs now and into the future and the DoD is concerned about the performance of the extra engine.

On May 20, Secretary Gates said, “The engine is far less mature. The proposed engine is still in development, has about 200 hours of testing compared to 13,000 for the F-135. The proposed engine is based on the design they currently have on the test stand, which we are deeply concerned may not meet the performance needs of the Joint Strike Fighter. Any cost to take the design to required JSF performance levels would presumably be paid by taxpayers.” By contrast, the F135 has logged more than 17,500 test hours, has achieved government certification, has powered vertical flight operations, has delivered the last test engine and has delivered the first four production F135s.

FACT: The DoD does not want or need the extra engine for the JSF.

Secretary Gates thinks funding the extra engine is wasteful and unnecessary. So does President George W. Bush, President Obama, 59 Republican and Democratic Senators, the Chiefs of the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps, Citizens Against Government Waste, Taxpayers for Common Sense, and many more.

FACT: The extra engine is at least 5 years behind the F135, and has delayed fielding of F-35 aircraft.

The extra engine is 5-7 years behind in development, has yet to power a plane in flight and has logged only a small fraction of the hours expected for this point in their test program. In approximately 17 months of testing, the extra engine has accumulated around 200 hours compared to the more than 2,300 hours that the Pratt & Whitney F135 had accumulated at the same 17-month point. Last year, the extra engine was paid for by delaying the purchase of multiple JSF test aircraft.

FACT: Procuring the F136 will delay Air National Guard deliveries.

The remaining $2.9B needed to complete the extra engine is not included in the defense budget, and must be taken from elsewhere the DoD. Money will have to be taken away from a defense program the military needs in order to fund a program they don’t need. The Air Force and the Air National Guard needs to replace its aging fleet of fighters, bombers and tankers, and wasting $2.9B on an extra engine when their fleet modernizations are underfunded makes no sense. Whether the delay is in JSF deliveries or some other impact to fleet modernization the impact to the Air National Guard will be negative.

FACT: The international JSF partners do not want to fund an extra engine.

The international partners have stated they do not want an extra engine if it will have a negative impact on the program. Buying two engines for the JSF increases the cost to the overall program limits the international partners’ on the quantity of aircraft they can afford, and delays deliveries. Extra engine supporters claim that the original the Memorandum of Understanding signed with the International Partners assured them that they would have an engine choice. In fact, the memorandum simply stated that if there were two engines, the partners could choose.

FACT: A vote for the extra engine is Washington “business as usual".

On May 20, Secretary Gates said, “Let me be clear. I believe the defense budget process should no longer be characterized by business as usual within this building or outside of it….Accordingly, as I have stated repeatedly, should the Congress insist on adding funding for a costly and unnecessary JSF extra engine or direct changes that seriously disrupt the JSF program, or impose additional C-17 aircraft, I will strongly recommend that the president veto such legislation.” Canceling funding for the extra engine has strong bi-partisan support. The Senate sent a loud message last year when a bipartisan group of 59 Senators voted for cancellation. Funding was slipped back in during conference by certain House conferees, voted against it. However, the funding was slipped back in during conference by certain House conferees

Secretary Gates Outlines His Objections To the Alternate Engine

Separating Myth From Fact

With lobbying intensifying over the wasteful extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter on Capitol Hill, it’s worth addressing a few of the more outrageous claims being made by supporters of the alternate engine with some facts from the Department of Defense's paper on the issue. 

Myth: “Past experience shows that two engine manufacturers competing drives down costs, spurs technological innovation and improves contractor performance.”

Fact: The Pentagon says the alternate engine would still require a further investment of $2.9 billion, and there is no guarantee that having two engines will create significant enough long-term savings to outweigh the additional costs and the burden of maintaining two logistical systems. In the middle of two wars, DoD has other higher priority uses for $2.9 billion.

Many proponents of a second engine cite the “Great Engine War” of the 1980s – when the DoD purchased engines for Air Force F-15 and F-16 fighters from two manufacturers. While much has been made of this example, the facts tell a more nuanced and inconclusive story. According to the Department of Defense, while the competition did appear to improve contractor responsiveness to Air Force needs, there were only minimal reductions in the acquisition unit price of the engines. Accordingly, it is difficult to cite this example as proof that substantial savings will occur as a result of having two engines.

In addition, the current engine contractor achieved savings of about 40% on the F119 engine on the F-22 without an alternate engine. Instead, the savings were the result of aggressive government management, improvement in the manufacturing process, and investment by both the government and the contractor. Pratt & Whitney is prepared to duplicate these results on the F135 engine for the Joint Strike Fighter.

Myth: The extra engine is 70% complete and only needs an additional $1.3 billion over the next five years

Fact: According to the Pentagon, the alternate engine would still require a further investment of $2.9 billion. Some have suggested that the necessary additional investment is much less; however, they are only looking at the cost to complete development of the second engine. The investment of $2.9B includes the costs to finish the development, conduct directed buys to prepare the second source for competitive procurement beginning in FY 2017, and create the necessary logistics support to operate and sustain engines on deployed F-35 aircraft. In short, $2.9B is the total additional cost required to take the alternate engine to full competition. The $1.3 billion figure only gets you part way there.

Myth: The Joint Strike Fighter will be the primary military fighter in the future, replacing many existing aircraft. It will represent 90% of our fighter power for 30 years. So, to not provide for an alternate engine to the sole sourced primary engine would have us assume a risk for much of our country's active fighter power that we never have before.

Fact: According to the DoD, the Department currently maintains two tactical aircraft programs, the F-22A and the F-18, which utilize a single source engine provider. Both programs have enviable safety records, and DoD is satisfied with the engines for both programs. Over the years, significant advancements in engine design, testing, and production have enabled DoD to manage the risks associated with single engine systems without having to ground an entire fleet.

Myth: General Electric’s new fixed price contract proposal for the alternate engine requires the contractor to assume all the risk for cost overruns.

Fact: According to the DoD, the fixed price for the engines would require GE to assume the normal amount of risk for a fixed price contract. The price is contingent upon a fixed configuration, so any changes to that configuration would require modification of the contract price. The remaining portions of the contract may be cost-type line items, which shift the risk for performance of those line items to the Government.

Myth: The second engine is not very far behind. It will start production after only 100 of the current engines are produced.

Fact: The DoD says A direct comparison shows that the F-136 Initial Service Release (ISR) dates are at least 2-3 years behind the F-135 ISR dates. The F135 Conventional Take-off and Landing/Carrier Variant achieved its ISR date in February 2010, and the same ISR date is planned for the F-136 in December 2012. The planned F-135 Short Take-off and Vertical Landing ISR date is fourth quarter of FY10 and the same ISR date for the F-136 is planned for fourth quarter FY13. There is also no guarantee that a second engine program will not face the same challenges as the current program has already faced and be forced to delay its own program.

Resist the Call of the Sirens

It’s budget markup season in Washington, which means a plethora of seemingly well-intentioned funding requests emanating like songs from the mythical Greek sirens, who lured nearby sailors to the rocky shoreline. Congress would be wise to be wary of these enchanting, but ultimately perilous calls.

Yet some Congressional leaders seem to be swayed, once again, into lending their support for the F136 extra engine for the JSF, despite billions wasted to date, decades of successful single engine military aircraft, strong performance by the F135 primary engine, and the crushing expense of higher priorities in a climate where our nation is facing record budget deficits.

On the one hand, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) expresses his admiration for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ passion for fiscal restraint by stating he “deserves high grades for courage” and that Congress would “like to be helpful.” But then he embraces the false notion of future competition for the engine to power the JSF, despite the Pratt & Whitney F135’s numerous wins throughout the F-35’s development and detailed reports that show that the F136 will consume another $2.9 billion in the unlikely hope of saving $1 billion later.

This knee-jerk reaction to buck the oft-stated wishes of the White House and Defense Department is puzzling, especially given Gates’ most recent comments on the urgent need to reign in runaway spending. En route to Kansas City on May 7, he told the media, “The message that I've had for the Congress over the last couple of years (is) that a dollar that they make us spend on stuff we don't need is a dollar we can't spend on what we do need. And in this constrained budget environment, that becomes all the more important.”

It’s also puzzling that the Senate, which ultimately rejected funding the F136 by a vote of 59-38 in 2009, would now follow the House and re-insert funding during their own committee markup process. The rhetorical similarities are disturbingly striking. Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and chairman of that body’s air-land panel said, "The committee has always believed that, to be a balanced program, competition needed to be an element of the engine program." Yet, this competition argument has been debunked before, and for good measure, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief Ashton Carter reiterated on May 4, “There is not a good analytical case that the upfront costs of the second engine would be paid back."

During his airborne press conference, Gates added, “One of the members of Congress, I'm told, said, ‘Well, why is $3 billion for the alternative engine such a big deal when we've got a trillion-dollar deficit?’ I would submit that's one of the reasons we have a trillion-dollar deficit, is that kind of thinking.”

In light of the current economic crisis, ongoing war efforts and the strong anti-earmark political climate, it seems Congress would want to make a clean break from pork barrel politics. Resist funding the F136 not simply to avoid the embarrassment and needless conflict associated with a potential Presidential veto. Do so because if this sort of wasteful spending isn’t stopped now, then there is little hope such budgetary recklessness will ever be curtailed. Ignore the selfish and deceitful sirens; instead, heed the clarion call of truth. If not now, when?

-- Eagleblogger

A billion here, a billion there...