Sun, Surf and the Smell of Jet Fuel

While many Americans made the most of the warm late August weather by catching a few final rays of summer, Pratt & Whitney used the occasion to indelibly scorch the image and sound of the F135 engine at full throttle into the minds of a select few journalists invited to the company’s test facility in West Palm Beach. Rather than try to describe it myself, I’ll leave it to one of the professional scribes in attendance.

“Stand on the edge of the Everglades with the August sun beating down on your head, the summer humidity wrapping your skin and the thunderous beat of 43,000 pounds of power causing your chest and the very ground beneath you to thrum,” observed Colin Clark of DoD Buzz. “I wagged my jaw a couple of times so the seal on the hearing protection broke and my ears absorbed the awesome roar of the test engine firing about 100 feet away, hung high in the air. That’s what it’s like to experience testing of Pratt & Whitney’s F135 STOVL engine for the Joint Strike Fighter. It was my first military jet engine test and you can take it to the bank that I was impressed with the technology and with the brute power unleashed and then channeled.”

Government certification (known as initial service release) of the STOVL variant F135 engine is expected before the end of the year and will mark a final achievement in a development program that has already logged more than 19,000 hours and irrefutably proven the maturity of the F135 in the process. It will also serve as an emphatic milestone in a noteworthy year that has already included CTOL variant certification, delivery of the final test engines, 10 flawless vertical landings and counting, a smooth transition to production, supersonic flight of the STOVL variant F-35, affordability goals that are being met, and delivery of eight production engines with about a dozen more before the ball drops in Times Square to usher in 2011.

But the West Palm Beach event was more than just a celebration of what’s come before. As Guy Norris wrote in Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, “Pratt & Whitney is upping the ante in the ongoing F-35 Joint Strike Fighter engine war by revealing the F135 has achieved combat-rated thrust 20% higher than the specification” – an accomplishment demonstrated on both test and production engines.
This level exceeds even the wildest claims from GE and Rolls-Royce, whose F136 engine has logged only about 400 test hours, despite a protracted gestation process that dates back to lost propulsion down-select competitions to the F135 for both the Boeing X-32 and Lockheed Martin X-35 JSF finalists.

Norris added, “Nevertheless, [Pratt & Whitney Military Engines President Warren] Boley says even though Pratt has demonstrated measured thrust with the conventional-takeoff-and-landing (CTOL) engine variant well in excess of the F135’s advertised 43,000-lb.-thrust capability, the focus remains on providing a systems-level solution to the F-35 thrust requirement.” In other words, a core that can generate more thrust than the lift fan or nozzle can accommodate will remain an untapped resource for which the customer has not expressed a need.

And because of the F-35’s stealthy characteristics, extra weapons and stores are unlikely to be carried externally and the platform itself will not be prone to the growth seen on fourth generation, non-stealthy F-15s and F-16s. Translation: “F-35 thrust requirements are set at the beginning of the program and are unlikely to change significantly.”
As the lazy, hazy days of summer yield to autumn and intense policy battles on Capitol Hill, images of the F135 exceeding specs and achieving major milestones are anything but a mirage.

– EagleBlogger

Tough Choices, Right Reasons

In an era dominated by shallow, partisan politics designed to perpetuate the status quo through the next election and beyond, we applaud the unadorned selflessness and courage demonstrated by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at his August 9th press briefing on acquisition reform.

Shunning the well-worn path of least resistance, Secretary Gates boldly identified a plan to reign in spending on his terms, rather than kick the proverbial can from the Pentagon across the Potomac and up to Capitol Hill. Generating $100 billion in overhead savings in five years won’t come easily, especially in the midst of relatively stagnant job market that drives politicians to be even more parochial than usual. However, the opportunity to restructure the right way, while also empowering the services to redirect savings towards higher priority warfighter needs, proved far too compelling to ignore.

“It is important that we not repeat the mistakes of the past, where tough economic times or the winding down of a military campaign leads to steep and unwise reductions in defense,” Gates said. And while newly stated measures garnered the majority of press coverage, it’s important to remember that more established saving priorities, including cancellation of the F136 extra engine, remain vital to long-term success.

“To see these initiatives in context, I think you need to step back and see them as the next move in a process that has been going on for two years,” Gates stated. “It began at the National Defense University with my speech in September of 2008; the far-reaching decisions on programs for fiscal year '10 that were made in April of 2009; the decisions on the alternate engine and C-17s earlier this year; and the Eisenhower Library speech in May.”

Lest anyone miss the F136 reference or doubt the Obama administration’s continued opposition to spending an additional $2.9 billion on an engine the military doesn’t need nor want, Gates added, “Any bill that takes the alternate engine…to the president, I am confident will be vetoed.”

The myriad reasons for canceling the F136 persist. It lost early competitions to power the Lockheed Martin X-35 and Boeing X-32 Joint Strike Fighter finalists. Years later, it remains very immature having accumulated a few hundred system design and demonstration (SDD) hours, while Pratt & Whitney’s F135, benefitting from its F119 predecessor that continues to power the F-22, has accumulated nearly 15,000 SDD hours. Today, the F136 remains in a test cell undergoing incremental development, while the F135 continues to prove itself in rigorous F-35 flight tests and has made a smooth transition to production. Further expenditure on the F136 is unlikely to ever be recouped, compared to the economies of scale that will only help lower F135 unit costs, benefitting all domestic and international F-35 customers and their taxpayers.

Secretary Gates has challenged Americans to “be mindful of the difficult economic and fiscal situation facing our nation” while also conducting two wars and countering numerous terrorist threats and rising powers. Tough times call for smart solutions, yet canceling the F136 remains a relative no-brainer.

– EagleBlogger

Imaginary Numbers: Repetition ≠ Truth

A basic tenet of advertising is that one’s message must be repeated ad nauseam before being retained by the target audience. Yet the monotonous drumbeat of F136 headlines belies the truth, especially when it comes to the imaginative claims about future savings at the expense of the taxpayer and warfighter.

The F136 team’s central argument begins with creative math. They claim that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) forecasts $20 billion in savings through a new competition to power the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Yet the March 24, 2010 report by the GAO cited does no such thing. In fact, the report on page 11 states, “Total saving of about 21 percent in overall lifecycle costs.” And yet even that figure applies only “when comparing actual costs to the program’s baseline estimates,” despite the fact the latter is always higher than the former due to initial program risk.

Next, the F136 team commits a sin of omission, conveniently ignoring the GAO disclaimer “we did not do an in-depth analysis” of the so-called Great Engine War. Even if they had, it would have been nigh on impossible to prove that decreased costs were solely the result of competition rather than program maturity, which includes decreasing risk and economies of scale.

So, from whence does the elusive $20 billion savings figure originate? Simple.GE and its F136 allies estimated the total value of the F-35 propulsion program at $100 billion and multiplied that number by 21 percent. 

Et voilà! 

Yet most of that notional $100 billion can never be competed. The GAO’s analysis could support estimated savings of $2B - $2.5B over 20 years of engine production but why should the U.S. taxpayers pay $2.9B up front in the HOPES of saving $2.5B over the next two decades? There will also be the added cost of dual Component Improvement Programs and mid-life upgrade programs as well as other costs due to inefficiencies inherent in duplicate logistics systems.

Historically, sustainment (personnel, logistics, spare parts, etc) accounts for two-thirds of an engine program. But F135 and F136 sustainment can’t be competed since each engine features proprietary design, components and tooling. Additionally, the federal government will be a major provider of sustainment services. Bottom line: no competitive benefit for roughly $60 billion of the F-35 propulsion program.

Production accounts for the other third of an engine’s lifecycle cost, yet in reality, competition will be limited here too. There are several engine components common to both the F135 and F136. Both the F135 and F136 Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) engines will utilize a common Lift System – half the cost of that variant. And for all CTOL/CV engines, Pratt & Whitney will deliver the augmenter duct/liner and nozzle. All this common hardware takes another $5 billion off the competition table.

Next, remember there won’t even be an F136 for the first five lots, followed by a government-mandated quantity split for lots six, seven and eight. That means no real competition until 2017 and thus another $7 billion subtraction.

Lastly, there is the international partner share of production valued at $8 billion. Will theoretical savings from competition in the international market benefit the US taxpayer? No.

These exceptions bring the actual figure theoretically open for future competition down to about $20 billion. The GAO report went on to state that it is reasonable to save 10.3-12.3%. Therefore $2.0-2.5 billion could be recouped through yet another JSF engine competition.

That’s about a tenth of what the F136 team claims.

But, the Department of Defense has stated numerous times in the past, an additional $2.9 billion will be needed to bring the F136 to competition in 2017, presuming no additional setbacks.

Spend $2.9 billion to save $2.5 billion at most? President Obama, Defense Secretary Gates and the Pentagon leadership aren’t the only ones who are saying no to the F136 extra engine. Countless taxpayers agree, especially math teachers. Imagine that.

– EagleBlogger

Influential Taxpayer Organization Joins Call To Eliminate Funding for Extra Engine

Americans for Tax Reform, an influential grassroots taxpayer organization, has joined the call to eliminate funding for the costly and wasteful extra engine for the Joint Strike Fighter.

ATR President Grover Norquist and Center for Fiscal Accountability Executive Director Mattie Corrao wrote to House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman Norm Dicks today urging him to, “swiftly reject any funding for the F136 Alternative Engine Program in the Department of Defense Appropriations Bill or the National Defense Authorization Act."

Norquist and Corrao explain that, “While proponents argue that the Alternative Engine Program is necessary to maintain a competitive engine market, there is nothing competitive about an entrenched political subsidy for an unnecessary and unwanted product” and reminding the chairman that “almost all of the Department of Defense’s engine contracts are already single source and there is no evidence that this has negatively effected engine production or national security.”

They also note that the extra engine “has been unwanted for four years by the officials charged with keeping the country safe is one that should be expeditiously removed from all future funding considerations.”

The full letter is here.

A Brief History Lesson

Following GE Vice Chairman Rice’s imaginative opinion about his perceived lack of any past F-35 Joint Strike Fighter engine competition, we thought we’d provide a public service and jog his memory, by providing a brief reminder of historical facts.

For major platforms like the F-35, complex systems may be procured via a Contractor-Furnished Equipment (CFE) or Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) acquisition strategy. Either option provides a full and open competition with government participation. When the GFE process is used, the government solicits competing proposals, chooses a winner, and that system is provided to the prime contractor. Conversely under CFE rules, the prime contractor conducts the competition and selects a winner with government oversight and approval.

This latter option was chosen for the F-35 propulsion system, resulting in proposals submitted by Pratt & Whitney and GE to Lockheed Martin, Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the original JSF contract competitiors. The Pratt & Whitney engine won that competition, and the government approved the process.

 Separately, GE was awarded a contract to begin developing the F136 extra engine. But it has since lost the support of two consecutive presidential administrations, prompting the Defense Department to urge Congress to discontinue F136 funding as the Pratt & Whitney F135 has proven itself at every stage of the development process and now into production.

 Yet, GE and their congressional allies still want to “re-compete” what they failed to win through the transparent down-select process described above. The fact that the F135 is meeting the requirements of the program and has successfully powered the F-35 through flight test stands in stark contrast to GE’s doomsday scenario that an extra engine is needed in case of a devastating, but heretofore completely mythical, fleet-wide grounding issue. But, if such occurrences were really a potentiality, wouldn’t the White House and Pentagon – charged with defending our nation – ask for such a redundancy? And for that matter, why not also mandate duplication in avionics, landing gear and other flight-critical systems?

The answer, as we’ve stated many times before, is that the best engine already won the competition, and has proven itself beyond a shadow of a doubt, through the most rigorous test program to date. As U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton A. Schwartz said in March 2010, “We are not in the 1980s any longer, where high-performance engines had suspect reliability.”

But despite all the rhetoric in Washington and elsewhere on this issue, this debate really isn’t about “us versus them.” Admittedly, the stakes are high for both engine teams, but they are far more critical for warfighters (who deserve only the best) and taxpayers (who crave fiscal restraint, not politics as usual).

Speaking at an event sponsored by The Hill newspaper on June 23, Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen encapsulated the overlapping interest of these two publics when he frankly stated, “The biggest threat we have to our national security is our debt.” He went on to admit that while incentivizing savings is difficult, it has been done over time. If not now, after the competition has already been won, then when?

School may be out, but GE Vice Chairman Rice might want to consider a summer class or two. We recommend History of JSF Procurement 101.

– EagleBlogger