Resist the Call of the Sirens

It’s budget markup season in Washington, which means a plethora of seemingly well-intentioned funding requests emanating like songs from the mythical Greek sirens, who lured nearby sailors to the rocky shoreline. Congress would be wise to be wary of these enchanting, but ultimately perilous calls.

Yet some Congressional leaders seem to be swayed, once again, into lending their support for the F136 extra engine for the JSF, despite billions wasted to date, decades of successful single engine military aircraft, strong performance by the F135 primary engine, and the crushing expense of higher priorities in a climate where our nation is facing record budget deficits.

On the one hand, Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.) expresses his admiration for Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ passion for fiscal restraint by stating he “deserves high grades for courage” and that Congress would “like to be helpful.” But then he embraces the false notion of future competition for the engine to power the JSF, despite the Pratt & Whitney F135’s numerous wins throughout the F-35’s development and detailed reports that show that the F136 will consume another $2.9 billion in the unlikely hope of saving $1 billion later.

This knee-jerk reaction to buck the oft-stated wishes of the White House and Defense Department is puzzling, especially given Gates’ most recent comments on the urgent need to reign in runaway spending. En route to Kansas City on May 7, he told the media, “The message that I've had for the Congress over the last couple of years (is) that a dollar that they make us spend on stuff we don't need is a dollar we can't spend on what we do need. And in this constrained budget environment, that becomes all the more important.”

It’s also puzzling that the Senate, which ultimately rejected funding the F136 by a vote of 59-38 in 2009, would now follow the House and re-insert funding during their own committee markup process. The rhetorical similarities are disturbingly striking. Rep. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and chairman of that body’s air-land panel said, "The committee has always believed that, to be a balanced program, competition needed to be an element of the engine program." Yet, this competition argument has been debunked before, and for good measure, the Pentagon’s acquisition chief Ashton Carter reiterated on May 4, “There is not a good analytical case that the upfront costs of the second engine would be paid back."

During his airborne press conference, Gates added, “One of the members of Congress, I'm told, said, ‘Well, why is $3 billion for the alternative engine such a big deal when we've got a trillion-dollar deficit?’ I would submit that's one of the reasons we have a trillion-dollar deficit, is that kind of thinking.”

In light of the current economic crisis, ongoing war efforts and the strong anti-earmark political climate, it seems Congress would want to make a clean break from pork barrel politics. Resist funding the F136 not simply to avoid the embarrassment and needless conflict associated with a potential Presidential veto. Do so because if this sort of wasteful spending isn’t stopped now, then there is little hope such budgetary recklessness will ever be curtailed. Ignore the selfish and deceitful sirens; instead, heed the clarion call of truth. If not now, when?

-- Eagleblogger

A billion here, a billion there...

New Video: Alternate Engine = Fewer Joint Strike Fighters

Just the Facts

       As the Pratt & Whitney F135 team this month celebrates two important milestones – delivery of the last F135 test engine, as well as the fourth and final engine in LRIP Lot 1 – the F136 team appears more concerned about trying to relive the past, or rather their perception of what might have occurred.

        We are, of course, referring to the so-called “Great Engine War” – an event that supposedly generated up to 20% cost savings for the taxpayer thanks to F-15 and F-16 engine competition. And while this handy bit of revisionism makes for a catchy slogan or two as part of the latest campaign to save the F136, it doesn’t necessary reflect reality. But don’t take our word for it.

        In 1989, Donald Pilling of the highly credible and fiercely independent Brookings Institution released a study entitled Competition in Defense Procurement.  As part of that work the author references USAF analysis that was presented to the House Committee on Armed Services and entered into the Congressional Record of the 98^th Congress in 1984. The Air Force analysis is presented below, labeled Table 2-2.

Table 2-2.  Air Force Analysis of Alternative Procurements for Fighter Engines
Billions of fiscal 1983 dollars unless otherwise specified
		Savings relative to a split award
Contract award	Cost to Government	Amount	Percent
		Six annual purchases
Split	17.32	…	…
All to Pratt & Whitney	16.39	0.93	5.3
All to General Electric	16.25	1.07	6.2
		One purchase followed by five annual purchases
Split	16.90	…	…
All to Pratt & Whitney	15.99	0.91	5.4
All to General Electric	15.74	1.16	6.9
Source: Defense Department Authorization and Oversight, Hearings on H.R. 5167 before the Committee on Armed Services,
98 Cong. 2 sess. (GPO, 1984), pt. 2, p. 255
Cited from: Competition in Defense Procurement, Donald L. Pilling, The Brookings Institution, 1989, pg 28.

Pilling’s analysis showed that split buys in two different scenarios would actually cost 5-6% or roughly $1 billion more than choosing a sole source acquisition strategy with Pratt & Whitney or General Electric. Sadly, the Air Force saw little option at the time but to continue along the path of competition for other arcane reasons, but in Pilling’s words, “Reducing program cost was not a factor…” Yet it’s worth noting that since then no military aircraft program has recreated such a contrived construct. Either way you look at it, full credit goes to the Defense Department, which has learned the true lessons of the past and vigorously opposes an extra engine for the F-35. As Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn wrote on February 23^rd to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Ike Skelton, “While much has been made of this example (The “Great Engine War”), the facts tell a more nuanced and inconclusive story.”

Despite all the rhetoric, the F-35 engine debate really needs to focus on the customer. This debate is about delivering the best and most affordable solution to DoD so that the true beneficiaries are American and allied warfighters, plus the taxpayers who support them. To that end, the Pentagon’s position, reinforced by Presidents Bush and Obama, begs the question: why does the F136 team think they know more than the Defense Department? If they’re looking for a slogan, we humbly suggest, “The customer is always right.”

        – Eagleblogger

 

Triple Threat: Good News on F135 Engine Testing, Production and Cost

As F-35 testing accelerates, so do the milestones for Pratt & Whitney’s F135, the sole engine powering the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Significant progress is worth noting in three crucial areas: increased testing, production deliveries and cost containment.

First, completed test hours now stand at roughly 13,500 out of a planned total of 14,832. The remaining hours will be logged this year now that all 11 ground test and 18 flight test engines have been delivered. Following the dramatically flawless first F-35B vertical landing in March, initial service release tests for the STOVL version have begun, marking the final phase of development for the F135.

Second, the completion of engine development on the CTOL/CV variant was marked by the official certification by the F-35 Joint Program Office on January 31, 2010. The first four CTOL/CV production engines have been delivered to the customer with 18 more to come before the end of 2010. This rate of roughly two engines per month should double in 2012 to four per month for low-rate initial production (LRIP) Lot 5.

Finally, this undeniably positive news about the F135 was reinforced during Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) testimony given recently, On April 13, U.S. Navy and Air Force officials recognized cost reduction progress on the F135 and reiterated opposition to the F136 alternative engine.

In prepared remarks delivered to the SASC’s Airland Subcommittee, U.S. Navy Vice Admiral David Architzel and his colleagues stated, “The Joint Assessment Team assessed that the F135 engine cost goals are achievable with the proper investment in cost reduction initiatives. The focus in the coming year will be to ensure the engine manufacturer and the government implement the necessary efforts to achieve the cost goals. The current LRIP 4 engine proposal shows that the engine manufacturer has begun to reduce cost in alignment with the JAT assessments and recommendations.”

U.S. Air Force Lt. Gen. Mark D. Shackelford and Maj. Gen. Johnny A. Weida said, “Continued funding for the F136 engine carries cost penalties to both the F135 and F136 engines in the form of reduced production line learning curves and inefficient economic order quantities. The department concludes that maintaining a single engine supplier provides the best balance of cost and risk. We believe the risks associated with a single source engine supplier are manageable due to improvements in engine technology and do not outweigh the investment required to fund a competitive alternate engine.”

When asked later in the hearing about the projected additional $2.9 billion associated with continued F136 development, Shackelford added, “Given the precious resources we have, we're better spending the money by continuing to refine the F135 and press forward with that as the engine for the F-35.”

-- EagleBlogger